This paper studies royalty negotiations between a patent holder and a downstream firm selling a product which is more valuable if it includes a feature covered by the patent. Royalties are negotiated in the shadow of patent litigation, which will determine whether or not the patent is valid and infringed. If the two firms negotiate after the downstream firm has already designed its product to i...

We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and hold-up problems in infinite horizon stochastic games. We illustrate that with respect to long run decisions, the common formulation of relational contracts as Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibria is in stark contrast to fundamental assumptions of hold-up models. We develop a model in which relational contracts are repeatedl...

Most literature on the hold–up problem assumes that ex post bargaining outcomes are insensitive to prior investment costs. However, many bargaining procedures admit multiple equilibria and hence allow investment costs to affect bargaining outcomes. On the other hand, multiplicity of equilibria leaves scope for coordination failure. We report on three experiments in which unilateral investment i...

The paper examines the theoretical foundations of the hold–up problem. At a first stage, one agent decides on the level of a relationship– specific investment. There is no contract, so at a second stage the agent must bargain with a trading partner over the surplus that the investment has generated. We show that the conventional underinvestment result hinges crucially both on the assumed bargai...