Women may face systematically greater benefits than men from adopting certain technologies, for example some health-improving technologies. Yet women often hold lower bargaining power, such that men’s preferences constrain household adoption in households containing men. Introducing a version of the technology is less effective, but has perceived costs or higher to men, increase and welfare com...

The “collective approach” to household behaviour relaxes the restrictive features of the unitary model by specifying household welfare to be a weighted combination of the individuals’ utilities. However, the weights are assumed fixed or exogenous to the analysis. This paper extends the collective approach by proposing and estimating a framework where the weights are determined and simultaneousl...

We develop and test a model of household bargaining over fertility when transfers between spouses are possible. The model makes precise how the fertility preferences of each spouse translate into fertility outcomes. We show this depends on whether or not spouses can commit to their future actions within marriage. If couples bargain with commitment, fertility outcomes take account of both spouse...

We elicit time preferences of spouses separately, as well as jointly, among rural households in China. This is done with a high-stakes time preference experiment. We apply a random parameter model to investigate within-household bargaining power. In general, husbands have a stronger influence on joint household decisions, however, wives gain influence in richer households and when the couple ha...

Bargaining Power is one of the important issues in oil trade negotiations. In this paper two effective factors in bargaining power i.e. patient time to deal and outside options of each player have been considered. The necessary relations for exchange of sources in negotiation have been derived.

BACKGROUND During the last three decades, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Iran has fallen considerably; from 6.5 per woman in 1983 to 1.89 in 2010. This paper analyzes the extent to which economic determinants at the micro and macro levels are associated with the number of children in Iranian households. METHODS Household data from the 2010 Household Expenditure and Income Survey (HEIS) is ...

Observable and Unobservable Household Sharing Rules: Evidence from Young Couples' Pocket Money The leading evidence against the unitary household models is that "who gets what" is significantly dependent upon "who earns how much." However, it is difficult to pin down the causal effect of relative earnings on intra-household resource allocation because households jointly decide both labor supply...

bargaining power is one of the important issues in oil trade negotiations. in this paper two effective factors in bargaining power i.e. patient time to deal and outside options of each player have been considered. the necessary relations for exchange of sources in negotiation have been derived.

The paper reviews recent theory and empirical evidence testing unitary versus collective models of the household. In contrast to the unitary model, the collective model posits that individuals within households have different preferences and do not pool their income. Moreover, the collective model predicts that intrahousehold allocations reflect differences in preferences and "bargaining power"...