We consider a two-stage model in which two firms first invest in R&D to reduce their marginal production costs, and then either compete or collude in the output market. When they collude, they bargain over a cartel agreement to divide the collusive profit. If bargaining breaks down, they revert to duopolistic competition. For both a location model and a linear demand model, we show that firms i...

The problem of robust line planning requests for a set of origin-destination paths (lines) along with their frequencies in an underlying railway network infrastructure, which are robust to fluctuations of real-time parameters of the solution. In this work, we investigate a variant of robust line planning stemming from recent regulations in the railway sector that introduce competition and free ...

Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function efiectively. Self interested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards ofiset the cost of reporting and the potential gains that can be obtained from lying. Payment schemes (monetary rewards for submitted feedback) can make truth-telling rational based on the correlation between the reports of difierent clients. In this pape...

The basic idea behind such information markets is that the pricing scheme of the market encourages the participants to buy or sell shares in accordance to their private information. Consider, for example, the security that pays $1 if the winner of the 2008 US presidential elections is democrat. An agent who privately believes with probability p that US will have a democrat president in 2008, wi...