This paper studies allocation problems with and without monetary transfers, such as multi-unit auctions, school choice, and course assignment. For this class of problems, we introduce a generalized random priority mechanism with budgets (GRP). This mechanism is always ex post incentive compatible and feasible. Moreover, as the market grows large, this mechanism can approximate any incentive com...

Research has consistently shown negative effects of multitasking on tasks such as problem solving. This study was designed to investigate the impact of an incentive when solving problems in a multitasking situation. Incentives have generally been shown to increase problem solving (e.g., Wieth & Burns, 2006), however, it is unclear whether an incentive can increase problem solving while attentio...

Objective: To detect the effects of incentive spirometry on pulmonary problems in patients with sickle cell anemia. Subjects: Forty patients with homozygous sickle cell anemia assigned randomly into 2 groups; IS group that received incentive spirometry as well as medical treatment and Control group received medical treatment only. Pulmonary functions were measured before and after 8 weeks. Resu...

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement e¢ cient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent’s type a¤ects other agents’utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to truthfully reveal his type when faced with CGV payments. We show that when agents are informationally sma...

This paper contrasts models of common agency in which principals compete in incentive contracts (that is, they make take it or leave it offers) with models where principals offer agents menus of incentive contracts from which the final contract is negotiated. It is shown that pure strategy equilibria in incentive contracts are robust to the possibility that principals might offer menus. In addi...