This paper discusses the incentive conflicts that arise in banking supervision in the EU in a principal-agent framework, where the regulator is the agent and the taxpayers is the principal. The regulatory agent in addition to maintaining financial stability (the objective of the principal) may pursue private interests. Incomplete information, insufficient accountability of the agent and lack of...

We decentralize incentive efficient allocations in large adverse selection economies by introducing a Walrasian market for mechanisms, that is, for menus of contracts. Facing a budget constraint, informed individuals choose lotteries over mechanisms, while firms supply (slots at) mechanisms at given prices. An equilibrium requires that firms cannot favorably change, or cut, prices. We show that...

This paper reviews the recent experience of the UK electricity distribution sector under incentive regulation. The UK has a significant and transparent history in implementing incentive regulation in the period since 1990. We demonstrate the successes of this period in reducing costs, prices and energy losses while maintaining quality of service. We also draw out the lessons for other countries...

abstract t he return of capital is fundamental to the intertemporal allocation of resources by changing the consumption behavior and capital accumulation over time. taxation on return of capital increases the marginal product of capital, meaning that capital stock is lower than when capital is not taxed, which results decreased growth and welfare in steady state. this paper studies the impact o...

I present a model of venture capital contracting in which contracts that involve a mixture of both debt and equity are efficient and dominate pure-equity and pure-debt financing. The optimal contract balances the venture capitalist’s incentive to intervene in the project and the entrepreneur’s desire for control. JEL classification: G24, G32

Consider a mechanism design setting in which agents acquire costly information about an unknown, payoff-relevant state of nature. Information gathering is covert and the agents’ information is correlated. We investigate conditions under which (i) efficiency and (ii) full surplus extraction are Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational. JEL Classification: D44, D82

An optimal contract may involve randomization when the agents differ in their attitudes towards risk, so that randomization enables the principal to relax the incentive constraints. The paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for local random deviations to be welfare improving in a neighborhood of a nonrandom optimum. JEL classification numbers: H21, H23, H26.

This paper presents structural estimates of bidding behavior in eBay computer monitor auctions. We use our estimates to reject the use of Jump Bidding (Avery 1998) or “Snipe or War” bidding (Roth and Ockenfels, 2000). We also find that longer auctions only have a small effect on price and experienced auctioneers respond to this incentive. JEL Classification Numbers: C1, C7, D44, L1.

This study presents results of the validation of an ultra-short survey measure of patience included in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Survey responses predict intertemporal choice behavior in incentive-compatible decisions in a representative sample of the German adult population. JEL-classification: D01, D03, D91, C91

We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies. We show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow–Debreu economy.  2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C7; C71; D5