Like Alex Byrne and Michael Tye, I accept Intentionalism about visual experience. Therefore I agree with them that “qualia ain’t in the head”: roughly, to have a visual experience is to stand in a relation, the “awareness relation” or the “sensory representation relation”, to a cluster of properties outside the head (Pautz 2006, 27). My target in Pautz (2006) was the further claim, defended by ...

The pain case can appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory, I argue. After categorising versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an “objectivist” and “non-mentalist” version is the most promising, provided it can withstand tw...

The argument from appearance for the content view or intentionalism attracts a lot of attention recently. In my paper, I follow Charles Travis to argue against key premise that representational can be ‘read off’ certain way thing looks subject. My arguments are built upon Travis’s original objection and reinterpretation Rodrick Chisholm’s comparative noncomparative uses words. Byrne, Schellenbe...

the famous theory in the field of textual meaning and interpretation is called “intentionalism” and on that basis, “the intention of the author of a work is in relation to the meaning of the work or its interpretation”. in recent years, a theory has been widely developed in contrast to the (above) famous theory, titled the theory of “anti-intentionalism”, or in its extreme form, the theory of “...

Recent psychological research shows that attention affects appearances. An “attended item looks bigger, faster, earlier, more saturated, stripier.” (Block 2010, p. 41). What is the significance of these findings? Ned Block has argued that they undermine representationism, roughly the view that the phenomenal character of perception is determined by its representational content. My first goal in...

Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the view that phenomenal character of a conscious experience exhaustively determined by its intentional content. Contrastingly, impure intentionalism holds there are also non content-based aspects features which contribute to character. Conscious attention one such feature: arguably contribution given not captured in terms what represents, properties object. Thi...

According to intentionalism the phenomenal character (“what it’s like”) of a conscious experience is determined wholly by its representational content. In its strongest forms intentionalism offers the tantalizing prospect of a reduction of phenomenal character to representational content. Arguments based on Twin Earth-like scenarios have shown, however, that if phenomenal character supervenes o...