Clashing security policies leads to vulnerabilities. Violating security policies leads to vulnerabilities. A system today operates in the context of a multitude of security policies, often one per application, one per process, one per user. The more security policies that have to be simultaneously satisfied, the more likely the possibility of a clash or violation, and hence the more vulnerable ...

Organizational security involves assuring data confidentiality, integrity and availability. These security principles have been captured by standards like ISO 17799 [1] which provides guidelines in the format of objectives to be achieved and controls to be implemented. Each organization interprets and selects applicable controls according to their culture, infrastructure and business to define ...

We introduce a formal framework to specify and enforce quantitative security policies. The framework consists of: (i) a stochastic process calculus to express the measurable space of computations in terms of Continuous Time Markov Chains; (ii) a stochastic modal logic (a variant of CSL) to represent the bound constraints on execution speed; (iii) two enforcement mechanisms of our quantitative s...

Information flow security provides a strong notion of endto-end security in computing systems. However sometimes the policies for information flow security are limited in their expressive power, hence complicating the matter of specifying policies even for simple systems. These limitations often become apparent in contexts where confidential information is released under specific conditions. We...

information security is one of the most important enterprise assets. for any organization, information is valuable and should be appropriately protected. also, security is to combine systems, operations, and internal controls to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of data and operation procedures in an organization. knowing the fact that with serious threat of unauthorized users on the int...

From the security point of view, one challenge for today's distributed architectures is to support interoperation between applications relying on di erent possibly inconsistent security policies. This paper proposes a practical solution for dealing with the coexistence of di erent security policies in distributed architectures. We introduce a model for specifying security policies in terms of s...

From the security point of view, one challenge for today's distributed architectures is to support interoperation between applications relying on diierent possibly inconsistent security policies. This paper proposes a practical solution for dealing with the coexistence of diierent security policies in distributed architectures. We introduce a model for specifying security policies in terms of s...

So to define MLS policy, it is necessary to first specify a set of security levels. This set of security levels is associated with a partial order relation denoted <. If l1 and l2 are two security levels then l1 < l2 is read l1 is lower than l2. When < is a partial order relation, it may happen that both l1 < l2 and l2 < l1 and l1 = l2 are false. In this case, we say that l1 and l2 are incompar...

In this paper we define and provide a general construction for a class of policies we call dynamic policies. In most existing systems, policies are implemented and enforced by changing the operational parameters of shared system objects. These policies do not account for the behavior of the entire system, and enforcing these policies can have unexpected interactive or concurrent behavior. We pr...