The leader-follower partially observed, multi-objective Markov game (LF-POMG) models a sequential decision making situation with two intelligent and adaptive decision makers, a leader and a follower, each of which can choose actions that affect the dynamics of the system and where these actions are selected on the basis of current and past but possibly inaccurate state observations. The decisio...

This work deals with subsidy transfer from a manufacturer to a retailer through the distributor in cooperative advertising. While the retailer engages in local advertising, the manufacturer indirectly participates in retail advertising using advertising subsidy which is given to the distributor, who in turn transfers it to the retailer. The manufacturer is the Stackelberg game leader; the distr...

Several models have been proposed for Stackelberg security games (SSGs) and protection against perfectly rational and bounded rational adversaries; however, none of these existing models have addressed the cooperation mechanism between adversaries. In a large number of studies related to SSGs, there is one leader and one follower in the game such that the leader takes action and the follower re...

Several models have been proposed for Stackelberg security games (SSGs) and protection against perfectly rational and bounded rational adversaries; however, none of these existing models addressed the collusion mechanism between adversaries. In a large number of studies related to SSGs, there is one leader and one follower in the game such that the leader takes action and the follower responds ...

Handling Editor: Stephanie Castro Weexamined follower relational identificationwith the leader as amediator and follower perceptions of leader creativity expectations as amoderator in the relationship between transformational leadership and follower creativity. Using a sample of 420 leader–follower dyads from an energy company in mainland China, we found that follower relational identification ...

In this article, we consider the linear-quadratic time-inconsistent mean-field type leader-follower Stackelberg differential game with an adapted open-loop information structure. The objective functionals of leader and follower include conditional expectations state control (mean field) variables, cost parameters could be general nonexponential discounting depending on initial time. As stated i...

Product portfolio management (PPM) is a critical decision-making for companies across various industries in today's competitive environment. Traditional studies on PPM problem have been motivated toward engineering feasibilities and marketing which relatively pay less attention to other competitors' actions and the competitive relations, especially in mathematical optimization domain. The key c...

Given a bimatrix game, the associated leadership or commitment games are defined as the games at which one player, the leader, commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy and the other player, the follower, chooses his strategy after having observed the irrevocable commitment of the leader. Based on a result by von Stengel and Zamir [2010], the notions of commitment value and commitment optimal stra...

We analyze non-cooperative environmental policy when the only strategic interaction between countries is through bilateral transboundary pollution, i.e., countries are closed or small open economies. When countries set pollution taxes simultaneously, there is no carbon leakage. However, in the sequential-move game, the leader sets its pollution tax lower than the marginal damage from own pollut...