he topic of corporate governance in general, and topmanagement compensation in particular, has received enormous attention in recent years.1 Although an increasing literature has examined various aspects of the corporate governance of manufacturing firms in the United States and abroad, the corporate governance of banks and financial institutions has received relatively less focus. Alignment of...

Ronghuo Zheng ([email protected]) “Essays on Corporate Governance, Managerial Incentives, and

Conflicts of interest between insiders (e.g, controlling shareholders) and outsiders (e.g., minority shareholders) are central to the analysis of modern corporation. In an integrated continuous-time contingent claims framework with imperfect corporate governance, we examine a controlling shareholder’s optimal choice of capital structure, ownership concentration, private benefit diversion, consu...

Over the past two decades, researchers in industrial organization in corporate ®nance have examined relationships between ``corporate governance'' and ``®rm performance''. In an interesting and provocative paper, Charles Hadlock, Joel Houston, and Michael Ryngaert analyze the impact of proxies for corporate governance, managerial incentives, and performance on the likelihood of a bankÕs being a...

This article examines the compensation of top managers of nonprofits in the United States using panel data from tax returns of the organizations from 1992 to 1996. Studying managers in nonprofits is particularly interesting given the difficulty in measuring performance. The article examines many areas commonly studied in the executive pay (within for-profit firms) literature. It explores pay di...

While COVID-19 has caused significant short-term disruptions in global value chains (GVCs), the longer run, pandemic will not be primary catalyst GVC evolution. As GVCs recover from initial shock, managers make restructuring decisions guided by long-term strategic considerations. This article describes barriers that lead firm may encounter when rethinking location/control for chain activities a...

This paper aims to investigate the choice of governance modes in Chinese family firms. For that purpose, we build a principal-agent model to conduct our analyses. There are two modes of governance that the owner of the family firm can choose from, either the relational governance or the professional governance. The choice of governance modes is embodied in managerial compensation under differen...

This paper jointly designs the level of external control that financial claimants have; characterized as likelihood of performance-based CEO dismissals, and the internal organization of firms. While the internal organization of a firm affects competition between lower-level managers to become the CEO, performance-based CEO dismissal and replacement alters the incentives due to this competition....