According to theory a pure meritocracy is efficient because individual members are competitively rewarded according to their individual contributions to society. However, purely individually based meritocracies seldom occur. We introduce a new model of social production called “team-based meritocracy” (TBM) in which individual members are rewarded based on their team membership. We demonstrate ...

The belief that status in society is based on merit is a central feature of the American Dream. This belief system justiWes status inequalities by locating the cause of status diVerences in the individual talents and eVorts of group members. We hypothesized that activating meritocratic beliefs increases the extent to which individuals psychologically justify status inequalities, even when those...

The authors examine the directionality of effects between global self-esteem, domain-specific academic self-concepts, and academic achievement. Special emphasis is placed on learning environments as potential moderators of the direction of these effects. According to the meritocracy principle presented here, so-called bottom-up effects (i.e., self-esteem is influenced by academic self-concept) ...

We study career choice when competition for promotion is a contest. A more meritocratic profession always succeeds in attracting the highest ability types, whereas a profession with superior promotion benefits attracts high types only if the hazard rate of the noise in performance evaluation is strictly increasing. Raising promotion opportunities produces no systematic effect on the talent dist...

J. THE CONTEXT: A SHORT HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICY AND LAW ...................................... ...... ........................ .. ..... .493 II. MISMATCH, EFFICIENCY, AND MERITOCRACy .................................... .497 III. RACE, ETHNICITY, AND MiSMATCH ............................. .. .... .............. ... .499 IV. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ... .... ............ ..... ...

The Ramón y Cajal Program promotes the hiring of top researchers in Spanish R&D centers and academic institutions. The centralized mechanism associated to the Program is analyzed. The paper models it as a two-sided matching market and studies if it provides the incentives to increase the quality of the researchers hired. We analyze the mechanism both under complete and incomplete information. T...