In this paper I discuss the problem of providing an account of the normative force of theories of rationality. The theories considered are theories of rational inference, rational belief and rational decision— logic, probability theory and decision theory, respectively. I provide a naturalistic account of the normativity of these theories that is not viciously circular. The account offered does...

ROBIN S. WAPLES,∗ PETER B. ADAMS,† JAMES BOHNSACK,‡ AND BARBARA L. TAYLOR§ ∗Northwest Fisheries Science Center, 2725 Montlake Boulevard East, Seattle, WA 98112, U.S.A., email [email protected] †Southwest Fisheries Science Center, 110 Shaffer Road, Santa Cruz, CA 95060, U.S.A. ‡Southeast Fisheries Science Center, 75 Virginia Beach Drive, Miami, FL 33149, U.S.A. §Southwest Fisheries Science C...

Judith Jarvis Thomson's Normativity (2008) is a formidable book in terms of both content and style (all otherwise unattributed page references in what follows are to this book). The structure is modular, as though to encourage the reader who wants to dip in and out. But as you read it becomes clear that dipping in and out would not be a good idea. Questions that occur to you are sometimes addre...

A central tension shaping metaethical inquiry is that normativity appears to be subjective yet real, where it’s difficult reconcile these aspects. On the one hand, pertains our actions and attitudes. other, real in a way precludes it from being mere figment of those In this paper, I argue indeed both real. do so by treating as special sort artifact, artifacts are mind-dependent nevertheless can...

5936 words 36634 signs 1. Epistemic normativity 2. Norms of rationality 3. Epistemic norms and concepts 4. The Ur-Norm of truth 5. Epistemic norms and epistemic values 1. Epistemic normativity When we evaluate our beliefs and our reasonings as justified or unjustified, good or bad, rational or irrational, we make, in a broad sense of the term, normative judgements about them. It is often said t...

A reductive analysis of a concept decomposes it into more basic constituent parts. Metaethicists today are in almost unanimous agreement that normative language and concepts cannot be reductively analyzed into entirely nonnormative language and concepts. Basic normative concepts are widely thought to be primitive or elemental in our thought, and therefore to admit of no further (reductive) expl...

I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding ...

Communitarianism is the thesis that it is ultimately the dispositions of a community of speakers that determine the content of a symbol. Boghossian‟s reasons for rejecting this theory turn on the fact that he sees the account as unable to accommodate the normativity of meaning, i.e. the fact that the content of a symbol must exclude parts of the world (application of the symbol to which would t...