We consider a combinatorial auction model where preferences of agents over bundles objects and payments need not be quasilinear. However, we restrict the to dichotomous. An agent with dichotomous preference partitions set as acceptable unacceptable, at same payment level, she is indifferent between in each class but strictly prefers unacceptable bundles. show that there no Pareto efficient, dom...

We consider a situation, in which a regulator believes that constraining a complex good created jointly by competitive agents, is socially desirable. Individual levels of outputs that generate the constrained amount of the externality can be computed as a Pareto efficient solution of the agents’ joint utility maximisation problem. However, generically, a Pareto efficient solution is not an equi...

Test suite minimisation techniques seek to reduce the effort required for regression testing by selecting a subset of test suites. In previous work, the problem has been considered as a single-objective optimisation problem. However, real world regression testing can be a complex process in which multiple testing criteria and constraints are involved. This paper presents the concept of Pareto e...

Most of the two-sided matching literature maintains the assumption that agents are never indifferent between any two members of the opposite side. In practice, however, ties in preferences arise naturally and are widespread. Market design needs to handle ties carefully, because in the presence of indifferences, stability no longer implies Pareto efficiency, and the deferred acceptance algorithm...

Standard lessons from economics tell us that an externality creates inefficiency, and that this inefficiency can be removed by internalizing the externality. This papers considers how successfully these lessons can be extended to intergenerational externalities such as emissions of greenhouse gas. For intergenerational externalities, the standard lessons involve comparisons between states whose...

Following the seminal work of Hurwicz (1972), the manipulability and efficiency of allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies have been studied intensively. Zhou (1991) established that any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism is dictatorial in exchange economies with two agents having classical (i.e., continuous, strictly monotonic, and strictly convex) preferences. T...

This research paper is devoted to the study of the properties for Pareto-type efficient point sets in separated locally convex spaces, based upon an earlier result on the coincidence of Pareto-type efficient point sets and the Choquet boundaries and the natural corresponding extension for the approximate efficient point sets in Hausdorff locally convex spaces. Both of these results represent an...