By using the descriptions of Out-of-Body experiences 13 participants, we aimed to have a picture what it is like be in this particular state consciousness. All information was grouped according following topics: consciousness status, self-boundaries, object perception, color other types perceptions, interactions with people or beings, emotions, and time movement perception. From first-person ac...

According to intentionalism the phenomenal character (“what it’s like”) of a conscious experience is determined wholly by its representational content. In its strongest forms intentionalism offers the tantalizing prospect of a reduction of phenomenal character to representational content. Arguments based on Twin Earth-like scenarios have shown, however, that if phenomenal character supervenes o...

It is one thing to have phenomenal states and another thing to think about phenomenal states. Thinking about phenomenal states gives us knowledge that we have them and knowledge of what they are like. But how do we think about phenomenal states? These days, the most popular answer is that we use phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal concepts are presumed to be concepts that represent phenomenal state...

It has often been thought that our knowledge of ourselves is different from, perhaps in some sense better than, our knowledge of things other than ourselves. Indeed, there is a thriving research area in epistemology dedicated to seeking an account of self-knowledge that would articulate and explain its difference from, and superiority over, other knowledge. Such an account would thus illuminate...

Philosophers have traditionally drawn a sharp distinction between phenomenal and intentional states. Phenomenal states are states with phenomenal or subjective character – something it’s like to be in them. The clearest examples of phenomenal states are perceptions, emotions, and sensations, which involve specific qualitative or sensory characters. Intentional states, such as beliefs, are menta...