What is it to have a reason? According to one common idea, the Factoring Account, you have a reason to do A when there is a reason for you to do A which you have—which is somehow in your possession or grasp. In this paper, I argue that this common idea is false. But though my arguments are based on the practical case, the implications of this are likely to be greatest in epistemology: for the p...

Since at least 1930, theorists working in moral philosophy and normativity more generally have recognized the importance of accounting for trade-offs in normative theories of what we ought to do.1 The most common way to do this is to appeal to contributory or pro tanto reasons. The thought is that the reasons for and against the options open to the agent interact and compete—in highly complex w...

This paper develops and defends a coherentist account of reasons. I develop three core ideas for this defense: a distinction between basic reasons and noninferential justification, the plausibility of the neglected argument against first philosophy, and an emergent account of reasons. These three ideas form the backbone for a credible coherentist view of reasons. I work toward this account by f...

Recent decision-making research claims to establish that, in violation of Savage’s normative sure-thing principle, individuals often wait to acquire noninstrumental information and subsequently base their decisions upon this information. The current research suggests that characterizing individuals as pursuing noninstrumental or useless information may be overstated. Through a series of experim...