Problem: distinguish chance regularities from causal regularities. Lewis’s solution: use ideal theory – promote those regularities to causal that, under reflective equilibrium, given all the evidence, retain their regularity under a nearest possible worlds account of counterfactuals Thus, R2: A causes B iff B is later than A and there is a constant conjunction of events of type A and type B in ...

Nearly all of us who participate in constitutional argument in subjective good faith share a second-order methodology of constitutional decision-making—that is, an approach to working out both our first-order theories of constitutional interpretation and our judgments about appropriate results in particular cases. That shared method involves a search for reflective equilibrium between our prior...

Biomedical ethicists often assume that common morality constitutes a largely consistent normative system. This premise is not taken for granted in general normative ethics. This paper entertains the possibility of inconsistency within common morality and explores methodological implications. Assuming common morality to be inconsistent casts new light on the debate between principlists and descr...

In this project, I seek to an answer to the question of whether the correct ethical framework is a deontological or consequentialist one. I begin with the assumption that morality is objective. Using that as a starting point, I discuss the two primary sources of data on moral topics: our intuitions and our judgments. I note some epistemic worries with regards to our moral intuitions, and argue ...