According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard 2008, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledgehow and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument ...

Critics in turn have raised a number of now-classic challenges. According to intellectualism, deliberately choosing which beliefs to hold is practically impossible; according to the many-gods objection, Pascal’s wager begs the question and hence is irrational; according to evidentialism, Pascalian reasoning is epistemically irresponsible and hence immoral; and according to various paradoxes, re...

The gradation of know-how is a prominent challenge to intellectualism. Know-how prima facie gradable, whereas know-that not, so the former unlikely be species latter. Recently, Pavese refuted this by explaining as concerning either quantity or quality practical answers one knows question. per se remains absolute. This paper argues, however, that in addition and answers, also differs how reliabl...

The academic literature on public intellectuals would argue that the days of scholars playing role are long behind us, and is in decline. This chapter examines extent to which may or not be case. It defines what it means a intellectual, catalogues related thesis decline, discusses data about prevalence faculty who exhibit behaviors consistent with intellectualism how this varies by institutiona...

This article is concerned with the tendency observable in critical reception by literary scholars and critics of Anwar Ridhwan’s third novel, Di Negeri Belalang (henceforth, DNB). Many believe that DNB replete intellectual discourse. Even claims his novels are written based on Malay-Islamic tradition. However, this admission draws attention to publisher’s blurb which associates work concept sim...

We consider a range of cases—both hypothetical and actual—in which agents apparently know how to φ but fail to believe that the way in which they in fact φ is a way for them to φ. These “no-belief” cases present a prima facie problem for Intellectualism about knowledge-how. The problem is this: if knowledge-that entails belief, and if knowing how to φ just is knowing that some w is a way for on...