The modern Theory of the Firm uses the concept of rent and makes implicit assumptions about equilibrium. An Austrian (Market Process) Theory of the Firm should have something to say about each of these. Two strategic perspectives are analyzed, the neoclassical microeconomic perspective (using the Ricardo-Marshall approach to rent) and the Market Process perspective (using the Fetter approach to...

Labour Market Regulation in the EU-15: Causes and Consequences – A Survey Why should floors be set under wages and working conditions by labour market regulations? This paper finds that efficiency arguments are questionable, because of the disemployment effects of strict regulation. Regulation is better explained in terms of the choices of the employed semiand unskilled worker group. This group...

Available online 13 May 2008 This paperpresents a difference in the comparative statics of general equilibriummodelswith land when there are finitely many agents, and when there is a continuum of agents. Restricting attention to quasi-linear and Cobb–Douglas utility, it is shown that with finitely many agents, an increase in the (marginal) commuting cost increases land rent per unit (that is, l...

This paper characterizes the optimal contract offered by an uninformed principal to an informed agent when the latter's reservation utility depends on his type. The informational rent is nonmonotonic so that interior types may have a vanishing rent or be excluded from trade. The paper identifies conditions for the optimal contract to be separating, to be nonstochastic, and to induce full partic...

This paper provides a new game theoretic model consistent with the premises of contestable markets. Two firms repeatedly compete for a natural monopoly position. The limit price of the incumbent is disciplined by a hit and run strategy of the entrant. In this model, contrarily to the well known Maskin and Tirole model (1988): i) productive efficiency is encouraged, the more efficient firm gets ...

This note analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain whether his rival has a head start, i.e., an initial advantage in the auction. The game has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome whose shape depends on the expected head start. In equilibrium, the potentially stronger player generates an informational rent if and only if he...

We introduce a novel method of modelling Tullock rent-seeking contests that avoids the complexities encountered by the ‘best response function’ approach. We analyse contests in which there are many risk averse players differing in their attitudes to risk. We establish that, if every player has a constant degree of absolute risk aversion, a unique equilibrium exists. We also establish comparativ...

Tax competition for a mobile factor is different in ‘new economic geography settings’ compared to standard tax competition models. The agglomeration rent which accrues to the mobile factor in the core region can be taxed. Moreover, a tax differential between the core and the periphery can be maintained. The present paper reexamines this issue in a setting which, in addition to the core-peripher...

abstract comparison of food prices in different periods, indicates fluctuations and continually upward trend. any change in agricultural sector variables, as main food supplier, will affect food price. productivity shocks and production gap are examples of such variables. in this paper ,hodrick prescott and kalman filters are used as generators of productivity shocks and production gap series. ...

Rent-seeking in the trade sector is an outcome of restrictions imposed on tariffs and import quotas by a government. In an effort to acquire more privilege in foreign trade, labor allocates a part of its time-effort to rent-seeking activity, while cutting down on production work. Given the importance of rent-seeking activity due to restrictions imposed by the government in the Iranian economy, ...