This paper is an argument to the effect that a certain view about mental representing, together with some very liberal constraints on the brain as a dynamic system, entails that the organism will tend to form adaptive mental representations of its environment. To show this, it will first be argued that although mental representing is a common thing indeed, representationalism, in the most impor...

The compositional interpretation of structures in discourse has raised the question whether some level of representation is indispensable in the analysis of the semantics of natural language. In this paper we formulate and motivate three notions of representationalism (a strong, a medium or midweak, and a weak one) and discuss to what extent existing formal semantic frameworks qualify as (stron...

The article deals with the problem of naturalistic explanation an essential feature all conscious mental states – phenomenal character. conception qualia realism can be considered as one options for a non-naturalistic this phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is believed that character experience explained in terms representational content are more acceptable to naturalism. As rule, these discussions, ...

While philosophers of perception develop representational theories olfactory experiences, there are doubts regarding whether features can be accommodated within the representationalist framework. In particular, it is argued that function olfaction not to represent stimuli but rather evaluate it. The article claims major accounts have problems in accommodating evaluative aspects phenomenology. H...

Radical Enactivism is a position in the philosophy of cognitive science that aims to displace representationalism, the dominant position in cognitive science for the last 50-60 years. To accomplish this aim, radical enactivism must provide an alternative explanation of cognition. Radical enactivism offers two alternative explanations of cognition. The first I call the dynamical explanation and ...

The structural representation (S-representation) account provides an increasingly popular way of understanding the role and value in cognitive science. Yet critics remain unconvinced that has resources to rescue representationalism. This paper reviews problems faced by S-representation account. In doing so, it offers a novel taxonomy divides objections into two broad camps ought be disambiguate...

Hill was a central-state materialist who kicked qualia upstairs into the brain. In this important and engaging book, he converts to externalist representationalism, kicking qualia downstairs into the extracranial world where they seem to reside. All awareness 'constitutively involves representations' (69); and 'the phenomenal character of an experience is the set of qualia that the experience r...

This article argues for the conclusion that anti-representationalism in the cognitive sciences is not a well-founded theory of cognition. This conclusion is supported by the observation that the link between the sceptical demonstrations and the anti-representational conclusion is too weak for the demonstrations to justify anti-representationalism in general. Rather than denying the need for int...