The project ART proposes to enhance passive RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) tags with cryptographically secure authentication. Starting with a short introduction into common RFID systems with passive tags, we present a motivation why secure authentication with standardized symmetric crypto algorithms for RFID tags is necessary for many applications. We demonstrate vulnerabilities of curre...

To the problem of many recently proposed RFID authentication protocol was soon find security holes, we analyzed the main reason, which is that protocol design is not rigorous, and the correctness of the protocol cannot be guaranteed. To this end, authentication test method was adopted in the process of the formal analysis and strict proof to the proposed RFID protocol in this paper. Authenticat...

Design of ultra-lightweight authentication protocols for RFID systems conformed with the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard is still a challenging issue in RFID security. Recently, Maurya et al. have proposed a CRC based authentication protocol and claimed that their protocol can resist against all known attacks in RFID systems. However, in this paper we show that their protocol is vulnerable to...

Passive Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags, due to their ability to uniquely identify every individual item and low cost, are well suited for supply chain management and are expected to replace barcodes in the near future. However, unlike barcodes, these tags have a longer range in which they are allowed to be scanned, subjecting them to unauthorized scanning by malicious readers and to...

RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) is recently becoming popular due to its convenience and economical efficiency. Furthermore, RFID nowadays comes into the spotlight as a technology to substitute the barcode. On the other hand, RFID is jeopardized from various attacks and problems as an obstacle of widespread RFID deployment: replay, spoofing, traceability, de-synchronization, un-scalability...

Two effective attacks, namely de-synchronization attack and impersonation attack, against Ha et al. ’s LCSS RFID authentication protocol, Song and Mitchell’s protocol are identified. The former attack can break the synchronization between the RFID reader and the tag in a single protocol run so that they can not authenticate each other in any following protocol run. The latter can impersonate a ...

In the context of Dolev-Yao style analysis of security protocols, we investigate the security claims of a proposed strong-security RFID authentication protocol. We exhibit a flaw which has gone unnoticed in RFID protocol literature and present the resulting attacks on authentication, untraceability, and desynchronization resistance. We analyze and discuss the authors’ proofs of security. Refere...

In this paper, we propose a lightweight mutual authentication protocol for low-cost Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags. Although RFID systems promise a fruitful future, security and privacy concerns have affected the proliferation of the RFID technology. The proposed protocol aims to protect RFID tags against a wide variety of attacks and especially Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. We f...

Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) systems are gaining enormous interests in industry due to their vast applications such as supply chain, access control, inventory, transport, health care and home appliances. Although tag identification is the primary security goal of an RFID system, privacy issue is equally, even more important concern in the RFID system because of pervasiveness of RFID ta...

RFID is a key technology that can be used to create the ubiquitous society. However, this technology may suffer from some serious threats such as privacy disclosure. In order to solve these secure problems we propose a strong mutual authentication protocol based on a lightweight public-key cryptosystem: NTRU. The protocol assures the confidentiality of the RFID system by encrypting the messages...