Imposed Benefit Sanctions and the Unemployment-toEmployment Transition: The German Experience We analyze the effect of imposed benefit sanctions on the unemployment-to-employment transition of unemployed people entitled to unemployment compensation on the basis of register data from the German Federal Employment Agency. We combine propensity score matching with a discrete-time hazard rate model...

The Effect of Inspector Group Size and Familiarity on Enforcement and Deterrence The paper provides new insights into the productivity of teams and the relationship between the inspector and the inspected party. Exploiting exogenous variation in the number of inspectors that are sent to offshore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, we find that adding an inspector does not simply result...

JEL Classification: Z13 Social sanction can substitute for the rule of law, particularly in communities where there are repeat interactions and where there is full information about past actions. The expectation of finacial boycotts or social shunning provides an incentive for reducing malfeasance. We construct a rich micro panel data set of U.S. Civil War soldiers from pro-war and anti-war com...

JEL Classification Code(s): J 31, J 71) "Perceptions of Discrimination, Effort to Obtain Psychological Balance, and Relative Wages: Can We Infer a Happiness Gradient?" There is a substantial literature that finds a linkage between happiness and relative economic well being as measured by earnings or wages. There is also a well documented racial gap in wages. One explanation for this is disparat...

This paper studies an incentive rationale for the use of group lending as a method of financing liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs. The joint liability feature associated with group lending lowers the liquidity risk of default but creates a free-riding problem. In the static setting, the free-riding problem dominates the liquidity risk effect under a plausible condition, thus making group lend...

Le développement de l’économie numérique pose des problèmes inédits par leur ampleur en matière possibles manipulations marché et choix consommateurs. Des stratégies trompeuses déloyales dans le champ du droit la consommation peuvent coexister se renforcer mutuellement, avec infractions concurrence, qu’il s’agisse collusion algorithmique ou d’abus position dominante. Face à difficulté détecter ...

In this article we incorporate notions of the fairness of sanctions into the standard model of public enforcement. When both the probability and magnitude of sanctions may be varied, the usual solution involves a very high sanction and a relatively low probability of enforcement if individuals are risk neutral. When the issue of fairness is added to the analysis, the optimal sanction generally ...

Sanction lists as published by national and supranational organizations contain details on sanctioned entities. Those lists have to be obeyed in order to avoid legal implications. Yet, sanction lists are of very low information quality. Nevertheless, regulatory compliance demands, that organizations check their customer master data against sanction lists. We analyze sanction lists in this contr...

The present paper thoroughly explores second-best efficient allocations in an adverse selection insurance economy. We start from a natural extension of the classical model, assuming less than perfect risk perceptions. We propose first and second welfare theorems, by means of which we describe efficiencyenhancing policies. Notions of weak and strong adverse selection are promising for interpreti...