A dynamic labor market auction is analyzed where the current employer (incumbent) bids against a randomly assigned entrant each period and the winner has to pay a price equal to his bid. The paper focuses on stationary equilibria where the market’s belief about the current employer’s type is stationary. The paper considers the case of independent private values. If the seller is myopic then the...

Search engines commonly use “sponsored links”, where certain advertisers’ links are promoted to be placed above others in return for monetary payment. It is natural to assume that all providers value a higher ranked placement more than lower ranked ones. Then how should the seller optimally sell these ranked slots is critical for the search engines. In this paper we study the seller’s (search e...

We give a new approach in modeling the incomplete information in a buyer-seller game. We assume that the seller does not know the buyer's utility function at all. Usually the problem is solved by determining the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, where it is assumed that the buyer's utility function has only some parameters unknown to the seller, and the seller knows the distribution of the...

in this article, decisions about price and stock allocation for a seller with multiple customer classes are analyzed. with each customer arrival, the seller needs to decide about accepting or rejecting the customer’s demand by considering the stock on hand. in the case of acceptance, one needs to decide about the selling price. after any change in the inventory level, decision about continuing ...

the purpose of this research is to evaluate the effective factors on relational marketing in mature relationships between buyer-seller. transaction versus relationship has been considered as a very important topic for research. in this research, marketing strategies are evaluated from two perspectives. the first view is marketing mix management (transactional marketing). transactional marketing...

We consider a mechanism design problem for energy procurement, when there is one buyer and one seller, and the buyer is the mechanism designer. The seller can generate energy from conventional (deterministic) and renewable (random) plants, and has multi-dimensional private information which determines her production cost. The objective is to maximize the buyer’s utility under the constraint tha...

We analyse optimal stopping when the economic environment changes because of learning. A primary application is optimal selling of an asset when demand is uncertain. The seller learns about the arrival rate of buyers. As time passes without a sale, the seller becomes more pessimistic about the arrival rate. When the arrival of buyers is not observed, the rate at which the seller revises her bel...