Certain markets evoke popular discomfort, distrust and even outrage. Trade in arms, drugs, toxic waste, child labor and body parts, for example, elicits these reactions to different degrees. This paper asks—what is it about some markets that brings about these responses? It is argued that three key parameters—extremity, agency and inequality—have a bearing on our intuitive reactions and serve t...

Locating a facility is often modeled as either the maxisum or the minisum problem, re ecting whether the facility is undesirable (obnoxious) or desirable. But many facilities are both desirable and undesirable at the same time, e.g. an airport. This can be modeled as a multicriteria network location problem, where some of the sumobjectives are maximized (push e ect) and some of the sum-objectiv...

We study the mechanism design problem of a social planner for locating two facilities on line interval [0, 1], where set n strategic agents report their locations and determines facilities. consider requirement minimum distance 0 ≤ d 1 between Given are heterogeneous, we model cost/utility an agent as sum his distances to both In heterogeneous two-facility location game minimize cost, show that...

In this paper, we propose the planar obnoxious facilities p-median problem. problem objective is to find p locations for that minimize weighted sum of distances between communities and their closest facility. version, add constraints each facility must be located at least a certain distance from partial set because they generate nuisance affecting these communities. The resulting extremely non-...

Incomplete contracts and inadequate enforcement of labor rights, together with the asymmetry power between a worker her employer, create an environment where employer can forcibly extract additional services (e.g. unpaid overtime or sexual favors) from beyond mutually agreed terms exchange. We show that coercive impositions co-exist voluntary transactions in labour market, positive incidence co...