Low Entropy Masking Schemes (LEMS) are a recent countermeasure against side-channel attacks. They aim at reducing the randomness requirements of masking schemes under certain (adversarial and implementation) conditions. Previous works have put forward the interest of this approach when such conditions are met. We complement these investigations by analyzing LEMS against adversaries and implemen...

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We propose a novel approach for quantifying a system’s resistance to unknown-message side-channel attacks. The approach is based on a measure of the secret information that an attacker can extract from a system from a given number of side-channel measurements. We provide an algorithm to compute this measure, and we use it to analyze the resistance of hardware implementations of cryptographic al...

We present a new 2-ary elliptic curve point multiplication method with resistance against side-channel attacks. This method provides two advantages compared with previous similar side-channel attack countermeasures: It avoids a fixed table, thus reducing potential information leakage available to adversaries; and it is easily parallelizable on two-processor systems, where it provides much impro...

In this paper, we present a new addition operation on Hessian curves with low cost. It can be applied to resist the side channel attacks for scalar multiplication, and also can be used to compute precomputation points for window-based scalar multiplication on Hessian curves over prime fields. We propose two new precomputation schemes that are shown to achieve the lowest cost among all known met...

Abstract An authenticated encryption chip with novel nonce generation circuit was developed. This associates the contents and receiving time of plaintext. It will also generate overlapping power compensation for whole chip. The integrated fabricated under SMIC 180nm technology. Under 1.8V VDD, 100MHz global clock, consumption is about 14mW within 50k gates. test result exhibits more than 10 tim...

A new side channel attack against a simple LFSR is presented. The proposed attack targets a single Galois LFSR running on an embedded device where the only accessible information is the side channel leakage. Even if it is made only of simple XOR gates, such an object is vulnerable to side channel cryptanalysis depending on its implementation. Our attack combines simple side channel analysis and...