We study a recently introduced deterministic model of competitive information diffusion on the Iterated Local Transitivity (ILT) model of Online Social Networks (OSNs). In particular, we show that, for 2 competing agents, an independent Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) on the initial graph remains a N.E. for all subsequent times. We also describe an example showing that this conclusion does not hold for...

With the increasing use of different types of auctions in market designing, modeling of participants’ behaviors to evaluate the market structure is one of the main discussions in the studies related to the deregulated power industries. In this article, we apply an approach of the optimal bidding behavior to the Iran wholesale electricity market as a restructured electric power industry and mode...

There have been great efforts in studying the cascading behavior in social networks such as the innovation diffusion, etc. Game theoretically, in a social network where individuals choose from two strategies: A (the innovation) and B (the status quo) and get payoff from their neighbors for coordination, it has long been known that the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of this game is not 1, since the Nash...

Within the context of games on networks S. Goyal (Goyal (2007), pg. 39) posed the following problem. Under any arbitrary but fixed topology, does there exist at least one pure Nash equilibrium that exhibits a positive relation between the cardinality of a player's set of neighbors and its utility payoff? In this paper we present a class of games/topologies in which pure Nash equilibria with the...

Due to the leaps of progress in 5G telecommunication industry, commodity pricing and consumer choice are frequently subject change competition search for optimal supply demand. We here utilize a two-stage extensive game with complete information mathematically describe user-supplier interactions on social network. Firstly, an example how apply our model practical wireless system is shown. Then ...

We demonstrate that correlated equilibrium can express conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a social group structure (a partition of players into social groups), we propose three properties that one may expect of a correlated equilibrium consistent with social group structures satisfying behavioral conformity. These are: (a) within-group anonymity (co...

We consider two types of grouping among users in utility systems. The first type of grouping is from Chen et al. (2014), where each user belongs to a group of users having social ties with it. For this type of utility system, each user’s strategy maximizes its social group utility function, giving rise to the notion of social-aware Nash equilibrium. We prove that, for a valid utility system, if...

We demonstrate that correlated equilibrium can express conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a social group structure (a partition of players into social groups), we propose three properties that one may expect of a correlated equilibrium consistent with social group structures satisfying behavioral conformity. These are: (a) within-group anonymity (co...

We study extreme Nash equilibria in the context of a selfish routing game. Specifically, we assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over m parallel identical links, to control the routing of its own assigned traffic. In a Nash equilibrium, each user selfishly routes its traffic on those links that minimize its expected latency cost. T...

This paper studies supermodular mechanism design in environments with finite type spaces and interdependent valuations. In such environments, it is difficult to implement social choice functions in ex-post equilibrium, hence Bayesian Nash equilibrium becomes the appropriate equilibrium concept. The requirements for agents to play a Bayesian equilibrium are strong, so we propose mechanisms that ...