A powerful reply to a range of familiar anti-physicalist arguments has recently been developed. According to this reply, our possession of phenomenal concepts can explain the facts that the anti-physicalist claims can only be explained by a non-reductive account of phenomenal consciousness. Chalmers (2006) argues that the phenomenal concept strategy is doomed to fail. This paper presents the ph...

one of the most important questions in epistemology is the nonphysical realities, like phenomenal consciousness. the main claim of physicalism is real explanations of events and properties are only physical explanations and representationalists are agree too. thus these realities can explained by the rule of biases of physical and objective events.on the other hand , phenomenalists maintain tha...

Experiences and beliefs are different sorts of mental states, and are often taken to belong to very different domains. Experiences are paradigmatically phenomenal, characterized by what it is like to have them. Beliefs are paradigmatically intentional, characterized by their propositional content. But there are a number of crucial points where these domains intersect. One central locus of inter...

Contemporary phenomenal externalists are motivated to a large extent by the transparency of experience and by the related doctrine of representationalism. On their own, however, transparency and representationalism do not suffice to establish externalism. Hence we should hesitate to dismiss phenomenal internalism, a view shared by many generations of competent philosophers. Rather, we should ke...

The Roman imperial monarchy is generally studied from the vantage point of ancient Roman history: the “Roman emperor” is viewed and analyzed as an element of the Roman world. This conventional approach fails to place this institution in a broader comparative context, that of monarchical rulers across world history. Systematic comparison opens up new perspectives and is indispensable in identify...

Horgan and Tienson (2002) argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states which is not established by Horgan and Tienson’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that ther...