Environmental regulators often use environmental policy to induce green investment by firms. However, if an environmental policy fails to exert a long-run effect on regulating the economic agents' behavior, it may be more reasonable to think of the firm as the leader in the game, since the investment in green technology is usually a strategic decision. In this paper, we consider a three-stage S...

We investigate advertising level, pricing and production decision problems in a supply chain when demand and cost disruptions occur simultaneously. The channel consists of one manufacturer and one retailer where demand depends on retail price and advertisement expenditure. We examine the case in both cooperative game and non-cooperative Stackelberg game.

We describe a method for an agent playing a generalsum normal form game to balance the rewards of exploiting a prediction of opponent behavior with the risks of being exploited by a self-interested opponent while guaranteeing a worst-case safety margin. Our algorithm, Restricted Stackelberg Response with Safety, calculates a probability distribution over the agent’s moves that balances those co...

In this paper, we introduce the concept of dynamic pricing within the context of our previous Stackelberg network game model and view the ISP’s policy as an incentive policy, and the underlying game as a reverse Stackelberg game. We study this incentive-design problem under complete information as well as incomplete information. In both cases, we show that the game is not generally incentive co...

in this paper, the competition between two supply chains and their elements is studied. each chain consisted of a manufacturer and a distributor and the two chains compete in a market with single type of customer sensitive to price and delivery time. therefore, this is a two-supply chain game and during the competition between two supply chains, elements of each supply chain (manufacturer and/o...

many studies have been conducted to determine the efficiency of two-stage network structures in the recent years. the two-stage network with additional inputs to the second stage, in which the second stage is independent of the first stage are one of these structures. thus, there is a need for a model capable of calculating the efficiency of two-stage structures as well as efficiency of each st...

We investigate the solvability of the reverse Stackelberg game. Here, a leader player acts first by presenting a leader function that maps the follower decision space into the leader decision space. Subsequently, the follower acts by determining his optimal decision variable. Such a game setting can be adopted within a multi-level optimization approach for large-scale control problems like road...

This paper demonstrates that in a duopoly model with firms being concerned about profit as well as corporate social responsibility (CSR), the outcome of game may coincide with the Stackelberg outcome. We argue that owner of the firm may use CSR orientation as a strategy to become Stackelberg leader in the quantity competition game.