We report an experiment designed to test the influence of noisy commitments on efficiency in a simple bargaining game. We investigate two different levels of commitment reliability in a variant of the peasant-dictator game. Theoretical analysis suggests that the reliability of commitments in this game does not affect efficiency. We find that accurate commitments promote efficiency, as expected ...

Commitments are crucial to understanding and designing autonomous agents and multiagent systems. We propose a deenition of commitments that applies especially well to agents in information-rich applications, such as electronic commerce and virtual enterprises. Our approach has a number of important features, including { not gratuitously translating social concepts to psychological concepts { di...

This paper is the first to comprehensively analyze impact of disclosure commitments by insiders participate in rights offerings US. Fried and Spamann (2020) have shown theoretically that such disclosures could help minority shareholders overcome information asymmetries allowing them mimic participation decisions insiders. finds empirical evidence these are not always sufficient facilitate mimic...

We introduce and construct timed commitment schemes, an extension to the standard notion of commitments in which a potential forced opening phase permits the receiver to recover (with effort) the committed value without the help of the committer. An important application of our timed-commitment scheme is contract signing: two mutually suspicious parties wish to exchange signatures on a contract...

Mercurial commitments were introduced by Chase et al. [8] and form a key building block for constructing zero-knowledge sets (introduced by Micali, Rabin and Kilian [27]). Unlike regular commitments, which are strictly binding, mercurial commitments allow for certain amount of (limited) freedom. The notion of [8] also required that mercurial commitments should be equivocable given a certain tra...

Selective opening attacks against commitment schemes occur when the commitment scheme is repeated in parallel (or concurrently) and an adversary can choose depending on the commit-phase transcript to see the values and openings to some subset of the committed bits. Commitments are secure under such attacks if one can prove that the remaining, unopened commitments stay secret. We prove the follo...