Considering dynamic, heterogeneous and autonomous characteristics of computing resources in grid computing systems and the flexibility and effectivity of economics methods applied to solve the problem of resource management, a double auction mechanism for resource allocation on grid computing systems is presented. Firstly, a market model of double auction is described, in which agents are utili...

Auctioning multi-dimensional items is a key challenge, which requires rigorous tools. This study proposes a multi-round, first-score, semi-sealed multi-attribute reverse auction system. A fundamental concern in multiattribute auctions is acquiring a useful description of the buyers’ individuated requirements: hard constraints and qualitative preferences. To consider real requirements, we expres...

Multi Attributes Procurement Auction is a well known solution for negotiation between sellers and buyers. Seller wants to sell the product with more prices while buyer wants to buy the product with fewer prices. This problem has been analyzed by game theory approach and one optimal solution is achieved for the seller and the buyer with this assumption that the seller knows the exact value of th...

There are many different ways to allocate resources in cloud computing. The economic methods are some of common ways to resource allocation. The auction-based method has some advantages compared with Fixed-Price method. The double combinatorial auction is one of the proper ways of resource allocation in cloud computing. Resource allocation in double combinatorial auction includes two phases. Th...

In this paper we consider the problem of designing a mechanism for double auctions where bidders each bid to buy or sell one unit of a single commodity. We assume that each bidder’s utility value for the item is private to them and we focus on truthful mechanisms, ones where the bidders’ optimal strategy is to bid their true utility. The profit of the auctioneer is the difference between the to...

Double auction markets have consistently been shown to realize almost full efficiency and prices very near the theoretical prediction. Research typically focuses on the performance of the double auction in single market environments. However, real economic activity is coordinated across multiple markets, a far more complex task. This paper uses experimental methods to examine the double auction...

Multi-attribute auctions (also called multidimensional auctions) facilitate negotiations based on multiple attributes, thus escape from the standard price-only domain into a rich multidimensional domain that can comprise additional attributes like e.g. guarantee conditions or quality. Most multi-attribute preference models used in auction mechanisms are based on a ranking derived from weighted ...

This paper proposes a simple descriptive model of discrete-time double auction markets for divisible assets. As in the classical models exchange economies, we consider finite set agents described by their initial endowments and preferences. Instead Walrasian-type market models, however, assume that all trades take place centralized where communicate through sealed limit orders buying selling. W...

We show why the failure of the affiliation assumption prevents the double auction from achieving efficient outcomes when values are interdependent. This motivates the study of an ascending price version of the double auction. It is shown that when there is a sufficiently large, but still finite, number of sellers, this mechanism has an approximate perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which traders c...