Winning bids in reverse auctions are efficient solutions (providing that fairly weak assumptions about the bidders are met). The auctions are efficient, un‐der the assumption that the utilities of all participants are quasi‐linear. This assumption is often unrealistic. Typically then, auctions are inefficient mechanisms. This paper presents the limitations and impracticability of the quasi‐ lin...

At the end of the 1990s online reverse auctions were proposed as a powerful tool to improve the performance of corporate procurement. However, as many of the promises of the e-Business world failed to materialize the issue received only little attention during the last years. Hence, it is not known what kind of role reverse auctions play and what kind of auction designs are used in practice. Fo...

Many scenarios in the living world, where individual organisms compete for winning positions (or resources), have properties of auctions. Here we study the evolution of bids in biological auctions. For each auction, n individuals are drawn at random from a population of size N. Each individual makes a bid which entails a cost. The winner obtains a benefit of a certain value. Costs and benefits ...

Many auction mechanisms, including rst and second price ascending and sealed bid auctions, have been proposed and analyzed in the economics literature. We compare the usefulness of diierent mechanisms for on-line auctions, focusing on the cognitive costs placed on users (e.g. the cost of determining the value of a good), the possibilities for agent mediation, and the trust properties of the auc...

A speculator can take advantage of a procurement auction by acquiring items for sale before the auction. The accumulated market power then be exercised in and may lead to large enough gain cover acquisition costs. I show that speculation always generates positive expected profit second-price auctions but could unprofitable first-price auctions. In case where is profitable auctions, it more This...

Abstract Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions buyers. These auctions distinguished the good for sale being nonrivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption—that is, they club goods. This affects how coalitional impacts auction performance. We study implications bidders on second‐price (or equivalently, ascending‐price) auctions. Although formation can benef...

This paper uses a unique data-set collected in a consistent way over a number of different auctions to investigate how empirical regularities in sequential auctions depend on the number of lots sold in those auctions. It is shown that prices tend to decline faster in auctions in which a small number of lots were sold. Starting prices tend to be higher in auctions with fewer lots, while average ...

VCG auctions with reserve prices are practical simple auctions with provably approximately optimal revenue, and have been crucial in the analysis of other appealing auctions. When different reserve prices are applied to different bidders, the auctioneer may choose to apply the reserves either before (eagerly) or after (lazily) the comparison of bids. Both auction forms have been studied in vari...

In this paper, we investigate trust of the online auctions one of most e-commerce fields used today, with online auctions; users could buy/sell items all over the world. Compared to traditional auctions, online auctions bring greater convenience while dramatically decreasing the transaction cost., Participants' trust more important one, this paper propose new algorithm that depends on bidder St...

Combinatorial auctions, i.e. auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more eecient allocations than traditional auctions in multi-item auctions where the agents' valuations of the items are not additive. However, determining the winners so as to maximize revenue is NP-complete. First, existing approaches for tackling this problem are reviewed: exhaustive enu-mera...