Duality for complete discrete valuation fields with perfect residue field coefficients in (possibly p-torsion) finite flat group schemes was obtained by Bégueri, Bester, and Kato. In this paper, we give another formulation proof of result. We use the category a Grothendieck topology on it. This simplifies reduces duality to classical results Galois cohomology. A key point is that resulting site...

Dr. Klarissa Stürner should be included in the author byline. She should be listed as the fourth author, and her affiliation is Institute of Neuroimmunology and Multiple Sclerosis Research, UMC Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany. The contributions of the author is as follows: contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools, handling of patients and clinical data. The correct citation is: Bester M, Forkert...

This theoretical paper explores screening with loan collateral when both the collateral value and the probability of project success fluctuate. Some model versions challenge the classic findings of Bester (1985) by showing that high-risk borrowers may in such case be more willing to pledge collateral than low-risk borrowers. Abundant collateral then would not signal low risk. The results may he...

In his basic model of debt renegotiation, BESTER [1994] argues that collateral is more effective if high risk projects are financed. This result, however, crucially depends on the definition of risk. Using the second-order stochastic dominance criterion introduced by ROTHSCHILD AND STIGLITZ [1970], we show that it is not a project’s high risk, induced by a high probability of default, that make...

V. Mlinar,1 M. Bozkurt,2 J. M. Ulloa,2 M. Ediger,3 G. Bester,4 A. Badolato,5 P. M. Koenraad,2 R. J. Warburton,3 and A. Zunger1 1National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Golden, Colorado 80401, USA 2Department of Applied Physics, Eindhoven University of Technology, P.O. Box 513, NL-5600MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands 3School of Engineering and Physical Sciences, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh EH14...

Consumers may observe previous consumers' choices. They may follow their choices if they think these consumers are better informed. In turn, firms may concentrate on influencing the early consumers. This, in turn, changes the nature of early consumers' choice behavior as a signal for other consumers. In this paper, I show that firms' influence activities need not distort earlier consumers' deci...

Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target.