We prove existence of equilibria in bipartite social games, where players choose both a strategy in a game and a partner with whom to play the game. Such social games generalize the well-known marriage problem where players choose partners, but there are no endogenous choices subsequent to a matching. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: A14, C71, C72, C78, J41.

The concept of stability á la J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, which is composed of a pair of internal and external stability requirements, formalizes the idea of standard of behavior. This paper studies the decisiontheoretic foundation of stability, by establishing some epistemic conditions for a “stable” pattern of behavior in the context of strategic interaction. JEL Classification: C70, C...

We study the ex ante incentive compatible core, and provide conditions under which the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty when agents are informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (2002a, Econometrica, 70, 2421–2453).  2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C71; D51; D82

The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch (1996) to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some anomalies when related to classical concepts. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch’s model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core (Kóczy, 2007). Subject classification: C71, C72

We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players’preferences are additive. JEL Classi…cation : C71, C63.

We characterize the position value for TU games with a cooperation structure in terms of the Myerson value of some natural modification of the original game–the link agent form. This construction is extended to TU games with a conference structure. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.

Conley and Wilkie (1993) introduced and axiomatized the Nash extension bargaining solution, defined on a domain of comprehensive but not necessarily convex problems. In this paper we present a non-cooperative game that implements the Nash extension solution in subgame perfect equilibria in the limit as the discount rate applied between rounds of play vanishes. Journal of Economic Literature Cla...

We prove the existence of a private value allocation for an economy with differential information where the commodity space may be infinite dimensional, and there is a continuum of states. We also discuss the existence, non-existence, and properties of two alternative value allocation concepts. JEL classification: D8; D82; C7; C71; C72

We show that the Owen value for TU games with a cooperation structure extends the Shapley value in a consistent way. In particular, the Shapley value is the expected Owen value for all symmetric distributions on the partitions of the player set. Similar extensions of the Banzhaf value do not show this property. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.

In this paper, we demonstrate the enhancement in detection sensitivity of an indirect X-ray detector based on poly(3-hexylthiophene) (P3HT) and fullerene derivatives [6,6]-phenyl-C71-butyric acid methyl ester (PC71BM) by adding perovskite quantum dots (PeQDs). The weight ratio P3HT PC71BM was fixed at 1:1 (20 mg/mL chlorobenzene), different amounts FAPbBr3 PeQDs (0–3) mg were added to P3HT:PC71...