In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D72.

Understanding the Development of Fundamentalism We use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects. Leaders work to enhance their followers’ observance level. We model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that, under reasonable conditions, rivalry among fundamentalists makes them more ex...

We study reforms of nonlinear income tax systems from a political economy perspective. present median voter theorem for monotonic reforms, so that the change in burden is function income. also provide an empirical analysis with focus on United States. show past have, by and large, been monotonic. support was aligned majority population. Finally, we develop sufficient statistics enable to test w...

Autocratic regimes, democratic majorities, private platforms, and religious or professional organizations can achieve social control by managing the flow of information about individuals’ behavior. Bundling agents’ political, organizational, attitudes with their prosocial conduct makes them care behaviors that they otherwise would not. The incorporation graph in score further promotes soft but ...

We study voters’ response to marginal changes the fine for electoral abstention in Peru, leveraging variation from a nationwide reform. A smaller has robust, negative effect on voter turnout, partly through irregular registration. However, representation is largely unaffected, as most of lost votes are blank or invalid. also show that an exemption compulsory voting substantially larger than ful...

We compare contrarian to conformist advice, a expert being one whose preference bias is against the decision-maker’s prior optimal decision. Optimality of an depends on characteristics information and learning. If either fully informed or fine can be acquired cheaply, then for symmetric distributions F state, (contrarian) superior if single peaked (bimodal). only coarse acquired, acquires more ...

This paper studies the impact of immigration to United States on vote share for Republican Party using county-level data from 1990 2016. Our main contribution is show that an increase in high-skilled immigrants decreases votes, while inflow low-skilled increases it. These effects are mainly due indirect existing citizens’ and this independent origin country race immigrants. We find political ef...

We show that the treatment effect estimated by standard methods such as regression discontinuity analysis or difference-in-differences may contain a transient “learning effect” is entangled with long-term of treatment. This learning occurs when variable interest agents’ efforts, and control correspond to success failure: failure gives agents information about how much their effort matters, cons...

We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote discouraging the competing party from voting. show that latter objective is particularly pronounced for an edge in race. Thus, increase support may lead adoption policies favoring its opponents so as asymmetrically demobilize them. study implications econom...