This paper evaluates performance of human subjects and instances of a bidding model that interact in continuous-time double auction experiments. Asks submitted by instances of the seller model (“automated sellers”) maximize the seller’s expected surplus relative to a heuristic belief function, and arrive stochastically according to an exponential distribution. Automated buyers are similar. Acro...

This paper studies the impact of the presence of human subjects in the role of a seller on bidding in experimental second-price auctions. Overbidding is a robust finding in secondprice auctions, and spite among bidders has been advanced as an explanation. If spite extends to the seller, then the absence of human sellers who receive the auction revenue may bias upwards the bidding behavior in ex...

This paper develops a framework for integrating contract markets with spot markets using tradable options for capacity. Sellers and Buyers may either contract for delivery in advance (the \contracting" option) or they may sell and buy some or all of their output/input in a spot market. Contract pricing involves both a reservation fee per unit of capacity and an execution fee per unit of output ...

This paper designs a novel fuzzy competition and attitude based bidding strategy (FCA-Bid) for continuous double auction in which the best transaction price is calculated on account of the attitude of the agents and the competition for the goods in the market. The estimation of attitude is based on the bidding item’s attribute assessment, which adapts the fuzzy sets technique to handle uncertai...

Display advertisements are a type of web advertisement, which are usually images or movies that are displayed as a part of web page. In a display advertisement market we consider that media sites (advertising media) are sellers, that ad spaces are goods, and that advertisers are buyers. Previously, a fixed price was set for displaying advertisements and ad agencies mediated the transaction. How...

When second-price auctions have been conducted in the laboratory, most of the observed bids have been “overbids” (bids that exceed the bidder’s value) and there are very few underbids. Few if any of the subjects in those experiments had any prior experience bidding in auctions. We report on sealed-bid second-price auctions that we conducted on the Internet using subjects with substantial prior ...

Ascending price auctions typically involve a single price path with buyers paying their final bid price. Using this traditional definition, no ascending price auction can achieve the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome for general private valuations in the combinatorial auction setting. We relax this definition by allowing discounts to buyers from the final price of the auction (or alternativel...

Following the multistage design approach, we propose two asymptotically efficient truthful double auction mechanisms, the BC-LP mechanism and the MBC mechanism, for an exchange market with many buyers and sellers. In this market, each buyer wants to procure a bundle of commodities and each seller supplies one unit of a commodity. Furthermore, various transaction-related costs will be incurred w...

eBay is the largest and most widely known of many internet auction sites designed to connect buyers and sellers around the world. An eBay auction consists of a set bidding period during which individuals submit “maximum bids” for an item. The winner the auction is the individual with the highest bid, and the price is equal to the second highest bid, plus a small bidding increment. This system i...

We design a simple ascending Vickrey auction for the combinatorial allocation problem. We make use of a concept called universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) price to design our auction. Our auction searches for a UCE price, which (along with an efficient allocation) provides enough information to compute the Vickrey payments of buyers. Our auction maintains non-linear and non-anonymous prices...