E Derivation of Trade Equilibria in Section 5.5 9 E.1 Conditions that must hold in any equilibrium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 E.2 Equilibria of type A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 E.3 Equilibria of type B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 E.4 Equilibria of type...

Based on Gibbs-Duhem law and using UNIFAC-FV computer algorithm, the activity of polymer component in polymer-solvent systems is determined. The variation of activity of components with concentration at different temperatures are used to find the equilibrium concentration, UCST, and LCST for the systems. Also by generalization of the method, Gel-Liquid equilibrium is studied in some three c...

This paper analyzes the stability of the (Pareto efficient) nonsunspot equilibria as a function of the constraints faced by consumers in their ability to transfer wealth between states of nature. The nonsunspot equilibria are independent of the constraints since they can be identified to the equilibria of the associated certainty economy. It is shown that the equilibria that are stable for the ...

Recently Bramoulle and Kranton [2] presented a model for the provision of public goods over a network and showed the existence of a class of Nash equilibria called specialized equilibria wherein some agents exert maximum effort while other agents free ride. We examine the efficiency, effort and cost of specialized equilibria in comparison to other equilibria. Our main results show that the welf...

We examine the coalition-proof equilibria of a participation game in a public good mechanism and study which Nash equilibria are achieved through the cooperative behavior of agents. The participation game may have multiple Nash equilibria, and various numbers of participants may be attained at the Nash equilibria. We provide sufficient conditions for the Nash equilibrium of the participation ga...

In this paper, we will introduce the general concepts of generalized multiobjective game, generalized weight Nash equilibria and generalized Pareto equilibria. Next using the fixed point theorems due to Idzik [5] and Kim-Tan [6], we shall prove the existence theorems of generalized weight Nash equilibria under general hypotheses. And as applications of generalized weight Nash equilibria, we sha...

In a common agency game a set of principals promises monetary transfers to an agent which depend on the action he will take. The agent then chooses the action, and is paid the corresponding transfers. Principals announce their transfers simultaneously. This game has many equilibria; Bernheim and Whinston ([1]) prove that the action chosen in the coalition-proof equilibrium is e±cient. The coali...