We extend the classical results on the Walras-core existence and equivalence to an ambiguous asymmetric information economies, i.e., economies where agents maximize Maximin Expected Utility (MEU). The interest of considering ambiguity arises from the fact that, in the presence of MEU decision making, there is no conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility, (contrary to the Bayesian ...

Recent decision theories represent ambiguity via multiple priors, interpreted as alternative probabilistic models of the relevant uncertainty. This paper provides a robust behavioral foundation for this interpretation. A prior P is “plausible” if preferences over some subset of acts admit an expected utility representation with prior P , but not with any other prior Q 6= P . Under suitable axio...

A reference-dependent generalisation of subjective expected utility theory is presented. In this theory, preferences between acts depend both on final outcomes and on reference points (which may be uncertain acts). It is characterised by a set of axioms in a Savage-style framework. A restricted form of the theory separates attitudes to end states (encoded in a ‘satisfaction function’) from atti...

Machina andSchmeidler show that the probabilistic sophistication can be obtained in anAnscombe– Aumann setting without imposing expected utility bymaintaining stochastic monotonicity and adding a new axiom loosely analogous to Savage’s P4. This analogous axiom, however, is very strong. In this note, we obtain probabilistic sophistication using a weaker (and more natural) analog of Savage’s P4. ...

The paper examines the economic role of modelling information on the decision problem of an exporting firm under exchange rate risk and hedging. Information is described in terms of market transparency, i.e., a publicly observable signal conveys more information about the random foreign exchange rate. We analyze the interaction between market transparency and the ex ante expected utility of the...

In this paper we provide an axiomatization for a representation of preferences over lotteries that is only one parameter richer than expected utility. Our model is a special case of Rank-Dependent Expected Utility. Moreover, we show that the same restriction on this parameter is required for: risk aversion; intuitive comparative static results for a reasonably general class of economically inte...

A major virtue of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, for example, in the theory of general financial equilibrium (GFE), is that they ensure time consistency: consumption-portfolio plans (for the future) are in fact executed (in the future) — assuming that there is perfect foresight about relevant endogenous variables. This paper proposes an alternative to expected utility, one which also delive...

A decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against nature. For each probability distribution over the state of the world (nature’s strategies), she has a weak order over her acts (pure strategies). We formulate conditions on these weak orders guaranteeing that they can be jointly represented by expected utility maximization with respect to an almost-unique state-dependent utility, tha...

This paper develops choice-theoretic foundations of the principal’s and agent’s behaviors that underlie the parameterized distribution formulation of agency theory. Both the principal and the agent are subjective expected utility maximizers and their actiondependent subjective probabilities are defined directly on the outcomes. The results are used to interpret and evaluate the common prior ass...

I characterize a finite additive utility representation for preferences over menus. The numbers of both positive and negative components in this representation are expressed explicitly in terms of preference. These expressions can be used to characterize models of temptation, perfectionism, context effects, and other phenomena. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D81