Abstract This paper offers a novel argument against the phenomenal intentionality thesis (or PIT for short). The argument, which I'll call extended mind intentionality, is centered around two claims: first asserts that some source intentional states extend into environment, while second maintains no conscious environment. If these claims are correct, then false, implies extension of predicated ...

The thesis of the extended mind has been upheld for a decade and defended seriously (Clark 1995, 1997ab, 1999ab, 2001ab, 2001ab, 2002, 2003; Clark and Chalmers 1998; Dennett 1996, 1998, 2000; Millikan 1995). However, there seems to have been little attention addressed to the sense in which the extended mind can have content, and the role of internal mentality standing in the unfolding of the ex...

The extended-mind thesis belongs to cognitive science. Although the background assumptions of cognitive science are far removed from those of Christianity, Christians may wonder whether the Extended-Mind thesis is even compatible with Christianity. Investigation of the compatibility of Christianity and the Extended-Mind thesis is made more difficult by the fact that there is not just one thesis...

Introduction Over the last quarter of the twentieth century, an orthodoxy of sorts had gelled in the philosophy of mind around a kind of psychological externalism, the idea that some mental states individuate sensitively to extra-cranial factors. More recently, two trends of thought have departed from this young orthodoxy in opposite directions. On the one hand, a cluster of ideas captured in s...