published by the press syndicate of the university of cambridge A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

published by the press syndicate of the university of cambridge A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

published by the press syndicate of the university of cambridge A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Firms commonly form syndicates to bid jointly for financial assets. Recently, this practice has come under legal scrutiny motivated by models which suggest syndicates may be anticompetitive. These models do not account for two important features of financial markets: bidders’ value estimates are likely to be correlated with each other, and complicated mechanisms known to be optimal in such sett...

W e consider eavesdropping strategies f o r a syndicate consisting of a number of co-operative eavesdroppers employing selective diversity in a wireless communica t ion cell. T h e potent ial f o r performance improvemen t over t h a t of a single eavesdropper is analyzed. Per formance l im i t s are developed by considering a syndicate w i t h a n arbitrari ly large supply of eavesdroppers. O ...

Despite the importance of investment syndicates for the Venture Capital (VC) industry to function, surprisingly little is known about the motives for syndication. In this study, I build on Entrepreneurial Finance studies that present uncertainty and risk associated with the investment as the main drivers of syndication. I then examine two important but less emphasized factors that affect syndic...

When a company goes public it is standard practice that more shares are allocated than issued. The resulting short position that the offering syndicate holds is commonly filled either by aftermarket trading or by the execution of the so-called overallotment option, a standard feature of IPO arrangements. We propose a simple theoretical model to study the implications of this combination of shor...

Markets for IPOs and debt issuances are syndicated, in the sense that a bidder who wins a contract may invite losing bidders to join a syndicate that together fulfills the contract. We show that in markets with syndication, standard intuitions from industrial organization can be reversed: Collusion may become easier as market concentration falls, and market entry may in fact facilitate collusio...