This paper examines a contractual setting with unverifiable investment and a durable trading opportunity, in which trade can take place in any one of an infinite number of periods. The contractual setting features cross-investment, meaning that the seller’s investment affects the buyer’s benefit of trade. Two different trade technologies are studied, one in which the seller has the individual a...

We study a two person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining. We show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small, then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus. Hence, bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold-up problem even when the agent ...

Standard setting raises a variety of antitrust issues. Cooperative standard setting often involves horizontal competitors agreeing on certain specifications of the products they plan to market, implicating core antitrust issues regarding the boundary between cooperation and collusion. The American Bar Association’s Handbook on the Antitrust Aspects of Standards Setting presents legal analysis o...

Hold-up risks can be mitigated by creating asymmetric information about the investment using information control. In this paper, we study the investment level and welfare achievable with information control and the information structure that implements them. Our main result identifies a separation between information that creates ex-ante investment incentive and information that causes ex-post ...

Vertical integration is often proposed as a way to resolve hold-up problems, ignoring the empirical fact that division managers tend to maximize divisional (not firmwide) profit when investing. This paper develops a model with asymmetric information at the bargaining stage and investment returns taking the form of cash and “empire benefits.” Owners of a vertically integrated firm then will prov...

In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by the absence of complete contingent contracts. In particular, this paper shows that when matching is assortative and sellers‘ investments precede market competition then investments are constrained eff...

an experimental study has been made of the hydrodynamics of a stage mixer-settler to obtain appropriate design information. in this paper several tests were done according to full factorial design of experiments with high reliability, since each test recurs seven times and the results of  them are very close to each other(p=1bar and t=25 °c). sauter diameter in each test is determined with phot...