We present in this paper an incentive-compatible distributed optimization method applied to social choice problems. The method works by computing and collecting VCG taxes in a distributed fashion. This introduces a certain resilience to manipulation from the problem solving agents. An extension of this method sacrifices Pareto-optimality in favor of budget-balance: the solutions chosen are not ...

Traditional centralized approaches to security are difficult to apply to large, distributed, multi-agent systems. Developing a notion of trust that is based on the reputation of agents can provide a softer notion of security that is sufficient for many MAS applications. However, designing a reliable and “trustworthy” reputation mechanism is not a trivial problem. In this paper, we address the i...

This paper assumes that individuals possess private information both about their abilities and about their valuation of a public good. Individuals can undertake collective actions on order to manipulate the tax system and the decision on public good provision. Consequently, an implementable scheme of taxation has to be collectively incentive compatible. If preferences are additively separable, ...

INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE PAYOFF MECHANISMS FOR GENERAL RISK THEORIES BY YI (LILY) LI AUGUST 2016 Committee Chair: Dr. James C. Cox Major Department: Economics This dissertation focuses on one methodological problem in experimental economics: how to pay subjects, or in other words, payoff mechanism issue. For example, one popular payoff mechanism is Random Lottery Incentive System (RLIS), that is, a...

A very important property for any mechanism is incentive-compatibility. A mechanism is incentive-compatible if no agent has an incentive not to follow the protocol. In this paper we present a new meta-mechanism that can be applied to any existing mechanism to make it incentive compatible. This meta-mechanism is Chuck Norris. This shows that any mechanism can be made incentive-compatible, and th...

A very important property for any mechanism is incentive-compatibility. A mechanism is incentive-compatible if no agent has an incentive not to follow the protocol. In this paper we present a new meta-mechanism that can be applied to any existing mechanism to make it incentive compatible. This meta-mechanism is Chuck Norris. This shows that any mechanism can be made incentive-compatible, and th...

A very important property for any mechanism is incentive-compatibility. A mechanism is incentive-compatible if no agent has an incentive not to follow the protocol. In this paper we present a new meta-mechanism that can be applied to any existing mechanism to make it incentive compatible. This meta-mechanism is Chuck Norris. This shows that any mechanism can be made incentive-compatible, and th...

Selecting the most influential agent in a network has huge practical value applications. However, many scenarios, graph structure can only be known from agents’ reports on their connections. In self-interested setting, agents may strategically hide some connections to make themselves seem more important. this paper, we study incentive compatible (IC) selection mechanism prevent such manipulatio...

We present a model of standard setting and patent pool formation. We study the effects of alternative standard-setting and pool-formation rules on technology choice, prices and welfare. We find three main results. First, we show that allowing patent pools may reduce welfare when standards are negotiated and patent pools need to be ex-post incentive compatible. Second, we show that it is not pos...