No studies were located that examined health effects in humans or animals exposed to threeor fourmembered mixtures of the five components of concern. No PBPK models were found for threeor fourmembered mixtures of these chemicals. The following subsections present evaluations of health effects data and discussions of mechanistic information pertinent to the joint toxic action of each pair of com...

Radiatively inefficient (or advection dominated) disks are discussed at an introductory level. Ion supported and radiation supported flows are discussed, the different consequences of advection dominated flows onto black holes vs. solid surfaces (neutron stars, white dwarfs), hydrodynamics, the role of the ratio of specific heats, and the possible connection between ADAFs and outflows.

OBJECTIVE To investigate whether the lack of knowledge of toxic agents in households is a risk factor for individual unintentional childhood poisoning. METHODS The case group (n = 25) was composed of caregivers of children under 60 months of age who underwent accidental oral poisoning and were treated at two reference hospitals in Porto Alegre, southern Brazil, and recorded in the Toxicology ...

This paper develops a model where short-term reputation concerns guide the public disclosure of information and affect welfare in a coordination environment. Entrepreneurs use public information to make investment decisions, and there is complementarity in their actions. There are and high and low states that determine the productivity in the economy, and the high state is more likely if the go...

The MIT Faculty has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. Abstract We identify conditions under which a bargainer makes inefficiently large (small) investments in search for information about the opponent's reservation price. The analysis starts with the observation that a player will invest too much (too little) if the opponent's exp...

We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second main result is that the second bes...

Lobbying is often represented as a common agency game. Common agency games typically have multiple equilibria. One class of equilibria, called truthful, has been identified by Bernheim and Whinston [Quarterly Journal of Economics 1986;101(1):1–31]. In this paper, we identify another class of equilibria, which we call natural, in which each principal offers a positive contribution on at most one...