In this paper, I demonstrate that the early Stoics adhered to a normative theory may be called intentionalist: moral significance of any action is not determined by its material content, but virtuous or vicious disposition agent’s soul and intentions arising from disposition. Since according all people are divided into sages non-sages, actions former morally right (κατορθώματα), whereas those l...

Abstract In this paper, we present two experimental studies on reference of complex demonstratives. The results our experiments challenge the dominant view in philosophy language, according to which demonstrative is determined by speaker's intentions. first experiment shows that a context where there are candidates for referent—one speaker’s intention, other some “external” factors—people prefe...

The most remarkable feature of Indian formal logic (as it was reflected by the most advanced system of Indian logic, by Navya–Nyaya) is clearly a close connection of a logical formalism to a linguistic material . . . A common characteristic of Indian knowledge on all stages of its existence was a consistent intentionalism, whereas European logic was still a predominantly extentional one. Import...

Abstract According to intentionalism, the semantic reference of uses demonstratives is fixed, at least partly, by speaker’s referential intention. In this paper, I argue against possibility existence a convention sort. My argument placed in Lewisian framework signaling games and consists several steps that correspond four anti-intentionalist arguments, already present literature, have proven in...

Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates (in the same or different metaphysically possible worlds) have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. Intentionalism (or representationalism) comes in strong and wea...

This paper is a companion to “Sensory Awareness is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument against Externalist Intentionalism” (forthcoming, with a reply by Michael Tye, in Nous). I generalize the argument of that previous paper. I attempt to show that, given the mild form of Internalism argued for in the previous paper, it is not only the case that the awareness relation cannot be ...