We provide a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to solve games with non-transferable utilities and externalities. We show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegotiated. In the ordinal game derived from these payoff configurations, we can find a partition in which no group of players has an incentive to jointly change their coalitions. For...

For some well-known games, such as the Traveler’s Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional game-theoretic solution concepts—and most notably Nash equilibrium—predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. In this paper, we introduce a new solution concept, iterated regret minimization, which exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many ...

This paper examines pricing policies for OPEC under the assumption that the cartel is composed of a block of s/~e~t/~r countries with large cash needs and a t.lock of .yuI’ercountrics with little immediate need for cash and a loHcr rate of discount. The decision problem for the twopart cartel is embodied in a game-theoretic framework and the optimal bargaining solution is computed using results...

We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers to bridge a gap between non-cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory. Theoretical results include the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) and the characterization of the grand-coalition SSPE as a generalized Nash bargaining solution, provided that it lies in the core. We also prov...

We compare the bargaining power of the patentee under American and English rules of legal costs allocation. Using the Nash Bargaining Game framework, we show that litigation can be a Pareto efficient outcome. The cooperative game framework allows us to examine how the institutional and market factors influence bargaining powers of plaintiff and defendant under different rules of legal cost allo...

We consider a cellular system with multiple Femtocells operating in a Macrocell. They are sharing a set of communication channels. Each Femtocell has multiple users requiring certain minimum rate guarantees. Each channel has a peak power constraint to limit interference to the Macro Base Station (BS). We formulate the problem of channel allocation and power control at the Femtocells as a noncoo...

In this paper, we propose a game theoretical model for joint scheduling and radio resource allocation in the downlink of a Long Term Evolution system, where Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access is used as the multiple access scheme. The context is that of spectrum sharing, with multiple users competing for the simultaneous access to the radio channel. We first give a layered system rep...

The paper examines the theoretical foundations of the hold–up problem. At a first stage, one agent decides on the level of a relationship– specific investment. There is no contract, so at a second stage the agent must bargain with a trading partner over the surplus that the investment has generated. We show that the conventional underinvestment result hinges crucially both on the assumed bargai...

This paper studies a one-shot, simultaneous-move bargaining game. Each bargainer makes a partial commitment (a share of the unit size cake that she would like to get), which can later be revoked at some cost to the player. The payoffs are defined, in part, by the Nash bargaining solution, where the feasible utility set is affected by the players' partial commitments. Under certain assumptions o...

As a result of public outrage over lower prescription drug prices in Canada, Congress passed legislation that would allow these drugs to be imported into the US. The lower Canadian prices reflect price regulation. Opponents of allowing these imports have argued that the US will import Canadian price controls and that profits of pharmaceutical companies will be hurt. In this paper, a model is de...