According to intentionalism the phenomenal character (“what it’s like”) of a conscious experience is determined wholly by its representational content. In its strongest forms intentionalism offers the tantalizing prospect of a reduction of phenomenal character to representational content. Arguments based on Twin Earth-like scenarios have shown, however, that if phenomenal character supervenes o...

It is one thing to have phenomenal states and another thing to think about phenomenal states. Thinking about phenomenal states gives us knowledge that we have them and knowledge of what they are like. But how do we think about phenomenal states? These days, the most popular answer is that we use phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal concepts are presumed to be concepts that represent phenomenal state...

It has often been thought that our knowledge of ourselves is different from, perhaps in some sense better than, our knowledge of things other than ourselves. Indeed, there is a thriving research area in epistemology dedicated to seeking an account of self-knowledge that would articulate and explain its difference from, and superiority over, other knowledge. Such an account would thus illuminate...

Abstract The paper presents a new philosophical theory of blurred vision according to which visual experiences have two types content: exteroceptive content, characterizing external entities, and interoceptive the state system. In particular, it is claimed that blurriness-related phenomenology interoceptively acuity in relation eye focus. proposed consistent with representationalist thesis phen...

Philosophers have traditionally drawn a sharp distinction between phenomenal and intentional states. Phenomenal states are states with phenomenal or subjective character – something it’s like to be in them. The clearest examples of phenomenal states are perceptions, emotions, and sensations, which involve specific qualitative or sensory characters. Intentional states, such as beliefs, are menta...

While for Brentano it is a mark of the mental that any state an object inner awareness, this suggestion notably rejected by Higher-Order Thought Theory (HOTT) consciousness posits non-conscious which isn’t and yet mental. I examine objection against HOTT, according to awareness phenomenally present in ordinary consciousness. To assess objection, investigate arguments Chalmers Montague favor phe...