coalitional game deals with situations that involve cooperations among players, and there are different solution concepts such as the core,the shapley value and the kernel. in many situations, there is no way to predict the payoff functions except for the expert experiencesand subjective intuitions, which leads to the coalitional game with fuzzy payoffs. within the framework of credibility theo...

This paper is considering the problem of dividing fairly the worth of the grand coalition in a transferable utilities game, in case that the coalition is formed. The computational experience for the Shapley Value, the most famous solution, is extensive, but the case of the Weighted Shapley Value and that of the Kalai-Samet Value have been barely considered. Based upon some results connected to ...

In an earlier paper of the author, the Multiweighted Shapley Values (MWSVs) have been introduced as linear operators on the space of TU games, which satisfy the efficiency and the dummy player axioms. An early dynamic algorithm for computing the Shapley Value is due to late M.Maschler. In the present work, we present a similar algorithm for computing the Multiweighted Shapley Values. For differ...

The Shapley value assigns, to each game that is adequately represented by its characteristic function, an outcome for each player. An elaboration on the Shapley value that assigns, to characteristic function games, a “partition function”outcome is broadly established and accepted, but elaborations to encompass games with externalities (represented by partition functions) are not. Here, I show t...

Central to this note is the concept of disjointly productive players. Two players are if there no synergy effect one these joins a coalition containing other. Our first new axiom states that payoff player does not change when another player, in relation leaves game. The second implies splits into two who together contribute same game as original change. These axioms, along with efficiency, char...