Recently, a dual reinforcement process to contextual discounting was introduced. However, it lacked a clear interpretation. In this paper, we propose a new perspective on contextual discounting: it can be seen as successive corrections corresponding to simple contextual lies. Most interestingly, a similar interpretation is provided for the reinforcement process. Two new contextual correction me...

How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use money to compensate agents for otherwise unsatisfactory outcomes. This paper studies this question, looking at both fairness and efficiency measures. • We employ the proportionally fair solution, which is a well-known fa...

In markets such as digital advertising auctions, bidders want to maximize value rather than payoff. This is different to the utility functions typically assumed in auction theory and leads to different strategies and outcomes. We refer to bidders who maximize value as value bidders. While simple single-object auction formats are truthful, standard multi-object auction formats allow for manipula...

We consider the egalitarian welfare of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We define and give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal egalitarian value (OEV) and investigate the effect that different well-known properties like ordinality, envyfreeness, and truthfulness have on the achievable eg...