Do low interest rate environments lead to greater bank risk-taking? We show that, when banks can adjust their capital structures, reductions in real interest rates lead to greater leverage and higher risk for any downward sloping loan demand function. However, if the capital structure is fixed, the effect depends on the degree of leverage: following a decrease in interest rates, well capitalize...

We construct a Risk Management Index (RMI) to measure the strength and independence of the risk management function at bank holding companies (BHCs). U.S. BHCs with higher RMI before the onset of the financial crisis have lower tail risk, lower non-performing loans, and better operating and stock return performance during the financial crisis years. Over the period 1995 to 2010, BHCs with a hig...

This paper proposes a model in which bank runs are closely related to the state of the business cycle. The benchmark model shows that, in a market economy, there are welfare losses due to the existence of bank runs. Extensions of the model explore the welfare effects of various government policies. The results suggest that an interest-cap deposit insurance scheme is an efficient policy to preve...

One of the important functions of financial intermediation is intertemporal risk smoothing. This paper studies the effects of a production shock in a closed economy and compares the abilities of market-based and bank-based financial systems in processing the shock. The analysis of the shock propagation indicates that a competitive banking system may collapse in absence of a proper regulation. P...

We investigate the trade-off between the risk-sharing gains enjoyed by more interconnected firms and the costs resulting from an increased risk exposure. We find that when the shock distribution displays “fat” tails, extreme segmentation into small components is optimal, while minimal segmentation and high density of connections are optimal when the distribution exhibits “thin” tails. For less ...

With regard to the market structure and performance in Bangladesh banking industry, there are two competing hypotheses—the traditional structure–conduct–performance (SCP) hypothesis and the efficiency hypothesis (EH). Using pooled and annual data for the period 1999–2002, this study tests the validity of these two hypotheses. In general, the results of this study support the EH hypothesis as an...

Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independent determination of each agent’s type (impatient or patient), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. For general preferences, we show, via a simple argume...

Private banks often blame state guarantees to distort competition by giving public banks the advantage of lower funding costs. In this paper I show that if borrowers perceive the public bank as supporting economic development, private banks may be able to separate firms by self selection, enter the market, and obtain profits in equilibrium despite their cost disadvantage. The public bank’s comp...

This paper investigates whether a bank regulator should terminate problem banks promptly or exercise forbearance. We construct a dynamic model economy in which entrepreneurs pledge collateral, borrow from banks, and invest in long-term projects. We assume that collateral value has aggregate risk over time, that in any period entrepreneurs can abscond with the projects but losing the collateral,...

Bank crises, by interrupting liquidity provision, have been viewed as resulting in welfare losses. In a model of banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex ante require costly crises to occur with positive probability at the interim stage. When bank payoffs are partially appropriable, either directly via imposition of fines or indirectly by the...