I study and compare preference aggregation in a simultaneous and a sequential multicandidate election. Voters have perfect information about their own preference but do not know the median voter’s preference. A voter has an incentive to vote for her second choice for fear that a tie between her second and third choice is more likely than she would like. Therefore, a voter may want to coordinate...

What could be motivating voters in transition countries to vote for leaders who have proven themselves to be skilled at violating human rights, repressing civil liberties, and ruling without democratic institutions? We test hypotheses related to this question by using a least-similar-systems design in which we search for common predictors of vote choice in presidential elections from two countr...

The empirical evidence on voting behavior suggests that the individuals’ choice of the vote is explained, among other things, by policy issues and the voters’ partisan preferences over the party that rules the government. The evidence also indicates that the voters’ partisan preferences are the best predictor of the choice of the vote (Republican and Democratic voters tend to vote, respectively...

Democracy is based on the principle of majority able to choose who leads them in a free and fair context devoid external interference political influence. The right elect wrong candidate even part democracy. law cannot regulate legitimate choices that democratic will entitled make. It chooses what it will. rejects not choose, or else ceases be fundamentally ought be, namely “free”. Vote trading...

Many people vote in large elections with costs to vote although the expected benefits would seem to be infinitesimal to a rational mind. We show that prospect and regret theories cannot solve this paradox of not voting and may even aggravate it. However, if the possibility of a decisive vote comes to mind, expected utility maximizers will doubt their preference for abstention and greatly overes...

There are many situations in which mis-coordinated strategic voting can leave strategic voters worse off than they would have been had they not tried to strategize. We analyse the simplest of such scenarios, in which the set of strategic voters all have the same sincere preferences and all cast the same strategic vote, while all other voters vote sincerely. Most mis-coordinations in this framew...

Like all surveys, the American National Election Studies (NES) imperfectly reflects population characteristics. There are wellknown differences between actual and NES-reported turnout rates and between actual and NES-reported presidential vote divisions. This research seeks to determine whether the aggregate misrepresentation of turnout and vote choice affects the aggregate measurement of party...

We present a voter verifiable Internet voting scheme which provides anonymity and eliminates the danger of vote selling even if the computer used by the voter cannot be fully trusted. The ballots cast remain anonymous even the machine does not know the choice of the voter. It makes no sense to buy votes the voter can cheat the buyer even if his machine cooperates with the buyer. Nevertheless, t...

We present a structural model of political advertising in equilibrium. Candidates choose advertising across media markets in order to maximize the probability of winning the national election. The voter model takes the form of an aggregate random coefficients discrete choice model in which advertising affects a voter's incentive to vote for either candidate or not to vote at all. We estimate th...