Based on Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) we tested the hitherto unexplored assumption that irrationality as conceptualized by REBT (demandingness, self evaluation, low frustration tolerance), is associated with erroneous statistical reasoning. We assessed trait irrationality of 216 respondents and individual estimates of future winning probabilities in the context of the Wortman (1975)...

We present a game-theoretic account of irrational agent behavior and define conditions under which irrational behavior may be considered quasi-rational. To do so, we use a 2-player, zero-sum strategic game, parameterize the reward structure and study how the value of the game changes with this parameter. We argue that for any “underdog” agent, there is a point at which the asymmetry of the game...

In this paper we give irrationality results for numbers of the form ∑∞ n=1 an n! where the numbers an behave like a geometric progression for a while. The method is elementary, not using differentiation or integration. In particular, we derive elementary proofs of the irrationality of π and em for Gaussian integers m 6= 0.

We describe an unexpected connection between bounded height in families of finitely generated subgroups tori problems and irrationality. Our method allow us to recover effective irrationality measures for some values algebraic functions

In this paper, we shed light on the dynamic characteristics of rational group behaviors and the relationship between monetary policy and economic units in the financial market by using an agent-based model (ABM), the Hurst exponent, and the Shannon entropy. First, an agent-based model is used to analyze the characteristics of the group behaviors at different levels of irrationality. Second, the...

The strategy of this paper is to throw light on rational cognition and epistemic justification by examining irrationality. Epistemic irrationality is possible because we are reflexive cognizers, able to reason about and redirect some aspects of our own cognition. One consequence of this is that one cannot give a theory of epistemic rationality or epistemic justification without simultaneously g...

Moore’s paradox in belief is the fact that beliefs of the form ‘p and I do not believe that p’ are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. Writers on the paradox have nearly all taken the absurdity to be a form of irrationality. These include those who give what Timothy Chan calls the ‘pragmatic solution’ to the paradox. This solution turns on the fact that having the Moorean belief falsifies its content. ...

Recent writers have invoked the idea that epistemic rationality gives us options in an attempt to show that we can exercise direct doxastic control without irrationality. Speci cally, they suggest that when the evidence for p is su cient but not conclusive, it would be rational either to believe p or to be agnostic on p, and they hold that we can in these cases e ectively decide to form either ...

It remains unclear if patients with different types of common mental disorders, such as adjustment, anxiety and depressive disorders, have the same irrational ideas. The aim of this prospective cohort study (n = 190) is to investigate differences in level and type of irrational beliefs among these groups and to examine whether a change in irrational beliefs is related to symptom recovery. Irrat...