This is a different question. Call this the Evidence Question. The EvidenceFor Question has received significant attention. Debates in the Bayesian literature about the correct confirmation function, for instance, are aimed at the answering the Evidence-For Question.1 The Evidence Question is somewhat less investigated.2 Nevertheless, it is important. According to prominent epistemological view...

In this paper, I analyze a type of externalist enactivism defended by Riccardo Manzotti. Such radical versions of enactivism are gaining more attention, especially in cognitive science and cognitive robotics. They are radical in that their notion of representation is purely referential, and content is conflated with reference. Manzotti follows in the footsteps of early causal theories of refere...

One line of objection to Externalism or Anti-Individualism is that, if it were true, causal explanations citing the content of mental states or events would be redundant. Another is that individuation by intentional properties would fail to be individuation by causal powers. My aim in the present paper is to answer these charges. But first a few terminological matters to get the charges into fo...

In “Weak Inferential Internalism” I defended the frequently voiced criticism that any internalist account of inferential justification generates a vicious regress. My defense involved criticizing a recent form of internalism, “Weak Inferential Internalism” (WII) defended by Hookway and Rhoda. I argued that while WII does not generate a vicious regress, the position is only distinguishable from ...

This paper tackles the problem of the nature of the space of perception. Based both on philosophical arguments and on results obtained from original experimental situations, it attempts to show how space is constituted concretely, before any distinction between the "inner" and the "outer" can be made. It thus sheds light on the presuppositions of the well-known debate between internalism and ex...

In this paper, we challenge Jaegwon Kim’s version of neural reductionism according to which the causal powers of mental properties are pre-empted by those of neural properties. Using empirical and theoretical developments from the field of embedded cognition, we articulate and defend a notion of process externalism that extends Clark and Chalmers’ notion of an extended mind. We argue that proce...

I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting. The paper divides into two sections. First, I explain precisely what internalists and externalists in epistemology disagree over. This puts us in a position to assess whether Greco’s argument succeeds. Second, I present Greco’s argument and offer two objections. 1. Internalism and...