In this paper we conduct two experiments within an agent-based double auction market. These two experiments allow us to see the effect of learning and smartness on price dynamics and allocative efficiency. Our results are largely consistent with the stylized facts observed in experimental economics with human subjects. From the amelioration of price deviation and allocative efficiency, the effe...

In this paper, we model production technology in a state-contingent framework. We assume that all the firms use the same stochastic technology, but they may have different risk attitudes and information sets, and ex post they may operate in different production environments. Firms maximise ex ante their preference function subject to a stochastic technology constraint; in other words, they are ...

Literature on Cultural Economics gives us some examples about how to measure technical efficiency. But, to the best of our knowledge, there is a lack in the case of allocative efficiency analysis. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap incorporating to Cultural Economics a methodology that analyzes both technical and allocative efficiency. Concretely, we use a Shepard’s distance function whi...

We introduce contingent auction mechanisms, which is a superset of combinatorial auctions, and where bidders submit bids on packages that are contingent on the whole nal assignment. Without externalities, the Vickrey and the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction are both robust if items are perceived as substitutes. Such an equivalence between those formats may not hold with externalities and the analo...

We study efficient, Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in a social choice setting that allows for informational and allocative externalities. We show that such mechanisms exist only if a congruence condition relating private and social rates of information substitution is satisfied. If signals are multidimensional, the congruence condition is determined by an integrability constraint, a...

We study e¢cient, Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in a social choice setting that allows for informational and allocative externalities. We show that such mechanisms exist only if a congruence condition relating private and social rates of information substitution is satis...ed. If signals are multidimensional, the congruence condition is determined by an integrability constraint, an...

Against the current backdrop of declining aid budgets, the efficient allocation of aid is of crucial importance for its effectiveness. Allocative efficiency (aid is allocated where it has the largest impact) has become at least as important as operational efficiency (aid is used in a way that maximises results per unit of spending). Donors have committed in international forums in Paris (2005),...

We propose a new measure of allocative efficiency based on unrealized increases in aggregate productivity growth. We show that the difference in the value of the marginal product of an input and its marginal cost at any plant the plant-input “gap” is exactly equal to the change in aggregate output that would occur if that plant changed that input’s use by one unit. The mean absolute gap across ...

This chapter is concerned with the issue of user fees (or user charges) for public health services. We discuss the implications of user fees for cost-e¤ectiveness, allocative e¢ ciency, equity, progressivity of public health care spending, and quality of service. Each of these is a desirable end in itself, and so each is an important factor in the optimal pricing decision. They are not always c...

In this paper, we conduct two experiments within an agent-based double auction market. These two experiments allows us to see the effect of learning and smartness on price dynamics and allocative efficiency. Our results is largely consistent with the stylized facts observed in experimental economics with human subjects. From the amelioration of price deviation and allocative efficiency, the eff...